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CASE NOTES

FEDERAL COURTS-ToRT

CLAIMS-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-FED-

ERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NOT TOLLED PENDING SETTLEMENT OF

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CLAIM. Mendiola v. United States, 401
F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1968).
On January 11, 1967, Mendiola filed suit against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act to recover damages for injuries sustained in 1963. The complaint alleged that a workmen's compensation
suit against appellant, Maryland Casualty Company, was settled on
March 16, 1965. The Casualty Company intervened to assert subrogation rights for the amount paid to Mendiola under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act. Appellants alleged that the suit was not
barred because under Texas law, when Mendiola proceeded initially
against the Casualty Company, the statute of limitations was tolled
pending the outcome of the compensation suit and thus the cause of
action did not arise until the claim was finalized in 1965. The United
States district court dismissed on the grounds that the action was barred
by the federal statute of limitations.' Held-Affirmed. When a cause of
action accrues was a question involving federal law. State law determines whether an actionable wrong was committed by the United States.
The federal statute of limitations was not tolled by the workmen's
compensation suit because section 2401(b) contains no tolling provision, either expressly or by implication.
A principal case involving the application of a federal statute of limitations is State of Maryland, Use of Burkhardt v. United States.2 In this
case, a wrongful death action was brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. Although the suit was timely filed under the federal statute
of limitations, the action was dismissed by the trial court because the
action was not instituted within one year, as prescribed by the wrongful
death statute of Maryland. The Fourth Circuit held that inquiry will
be made into state law for the purpose of defining the actionable wrong,
but to the federal statute to determine the time period within which
the action may be instituted.3 State law determines the character of the
cause of action and the damages recoverable, but it does not determine
the time within which the action must be commenced. 4 The court noted
there is practical value in looking to state law to characterize the numerous tort actions that may arise, but the problem of limitations was a
128 U.S.C. § 2401(b) provides:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented
in writing to the appropriate federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which
it was presented.
2 165 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1947).
3Id.
4 Id.
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simple matter that Congress could establish for all such actions that may
arise."
The majority rule is that federal law determines when a claim or
cause of action accrues within the meaning of section 2401 (b). 6 In
Quinton v. United States,7 the plaintiff's wife was given the wrong blood

type during a transfusion at an Air Force base hospital. The transfusion
occurred in 1956 but the mistake was not discovered until 1959. Suit
was instituted in 1960, and the federal district court held that under the
law of Washington the claim accrued when the alleged negligent act
occurred, in 1956, and was thus barred by the two year federal limitation period. Reversing, the Fifth Circuit held that the claim accrued in
1959 when the negligence was discovered; therefore, the action instituted in 1960 was timely under section 2401(b). Under this statute, federal law and not the state law, determines when the federal statute of
limitations begins to run on tort claims against the United States. 8 Judge
Tuttle, speaking for the court, stated: we look to state law to determine
whether the plaintiff's action is premature, but to federal law to determine whether the action is stale. 9 If under state law the plaintiff has a
cause of action, federal law will determine whether the suit against the
Government was timely instituted. 10 The court felt it was the intention
of Congress that a single statute of limitations govern all actions brought
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act and that
the uniformity Congress sought to accomplish would be defeated if the
various states' rules were used to determine when the period in section
2401(b) begins to run." The appellant in Kossick v. United States12 was
injured in 1950 while a patient in a Public Health Hospital in New
York. Surgery to correct the ailment was performed in 1952, and he
continued to make occasional visits to the hospital until 1961. When
the suit was instituted in 1963, the appellant contended that a cause of
action did not accrue under New York law as long as the plaintiff was
under continuous treatment for his injury. The court held that the action was barred by section 2401(b). The appellant had to discover his
injury when it was inflicted in 1950, or at the latest in 1952 when corrective surgery was attempted. It would be adverse to the purpose of the
federal statute to allow a state rule postponing "accrual" far beyond any
necessities of the case to subject the United States to the stale claims
5Id.
6 Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962); Beech v. United States, 345
F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1965); Kossick v. United States, 330 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 837 (1964); Kington v. United States, 396 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
89 S. Ct. 396 (1968); Hungerford v. United States, 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962).
7 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962).
81d.
91d. at 239.
10 Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962).
11id.
12 330 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 397 (1964).
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which the prescription of the short two-year period was intended to
avoid.' 3 To allow postponement of the running of the statute as long
as appellant exercised his right to further treatment would likewise be
unreasonable, because he would have this privilege as long as he retained his present employment as a seaman. 14 In Hungerford v. United
States,', an organic injury to the brain of traumatic origin was negligently diagnosed as psychosomatic. The injury was sustained in 1950
while the appellant was serving in the Army. He subsequently experienced blackouts and head pains. In 1957 an incorrect diagnosis was made
at a veterans' hospital. In 1959 the true nature of his injury was discovered and suit was instituted in 1960. The district court dismissed
the action. In reversing, the court held that federal law governs when a
cause of action accrues and the federal limitation period begins to run
under the statute. 16 The provisions of section 1346(b) 17 and section
2674,18 allowing liability of the United States to be determined as if it
were a private individual, had reference only to the question of substantive liability and not to whether the suit is timely filed under section 2401(b).' 9 A malpractice claim against the government accrues
when, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the claimant discovered
or should have discovered the negligence.20 Because the incorrect diagnosis was not discovered until 1959, the suit was not barred by the
federal limitation period. Kington v. United States21 held that a cause
of action for wrongful death accrued upon the date of death although
the cause was not discovered for two months. Plaintiff's husband was
exposed to beryllium while working in federally owned facilities. He
died in July, 1964, and the suit was not brought until August, 1966.
Although the actual cause of death was not learned until two months
after death, the plaintiff had a reasonable time in which22 to institute suit
within the two years prescribed by the federal statute.
The minority view of a literal interpretation of the statute is exId. at 935.
14 Kossick v. United States, 330 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 837 (1964).
15 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962).
16 Id.
17 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) provides:
Subject to provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts . . . shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions . . . or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. (1966)
18 28 U.S.C. § 2674 provides:
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to
tort claims, in the same manner and to the extent as a private individual under like
circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive
damages. (1948)
19 Hungerford v. United States, 309 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962).
20 Id.
21 396 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 397 (1968).
22 Id.
13
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pressed in Tessier v. United States.23 Metal fragments were left in plaintiff's body during an appendectomy performed at a veterans' hospital in
1947. The fragments were not discovered until 1954. The court, applying Maine law held that a cause of action accrues when it may be made
the basis of judicial action. They reasoned that under section 2674,
which provides: ". . . the United States shall be liable ... in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under similar
circumstances .... " a cause of action arises when a private person would
become liable under the law of the state where the negligent act or
omission occurred. 24 The law of Maine allowed a cause of action in
1947, when the tort occurred. Because his claim was not filed within
two years, it was barred by section 2401(b). Judge Duniway's dissenting
opinion in Hungerford v. United States25 expressed a view similar to
that held in Tessier. He said that just because Congress eliminated the
problem of which state's statute of limitations to apply, by enacting a
uniform time period within which to institute an action against the
Government, this does not lead to the conclusion that the words "after
such claim accrues" were to be interpreted by application of federal
law. 26 Had this been their intention, Congress could have so provided
in the Act.27 In support of his opinion he noted that section 1346(b)
provides that district courts have jurisdiction ". . . of civil actions on
claims against the United States . . . under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 He concluded that because the majority opinion was not in
accordance with the law of the state where the tort occurred, the United
States is not liable ". . . in the same manner and to the same extent as
29
a private individual ....
The limitation period within which Congress consented to allow
suits to be brought against the United States should be strictly construed, and exceptions are not to be implied.30 Federal court interpretation governs when the application of a state statute of limitations
conflicts with the federal statute. 31 In United States v. Westfall,3 2 the
plaintiff was injured in Washington in 1946, but suit was not brought
23 269 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1959).
24 Id.

25ld.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.

291d. at 309.
30 Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 77 S. Ct. 269, 1 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1957); Mann v.
United States, 399 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1968).
31 United States v. Westfall, 197 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1952); Young v. United States, 184
F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
32 197 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1952).
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until 1950. The government contended that the action was barred by
the state statute prescribing a three year limitation period for suits involving personal injury. The court held that "The Tort Claims Act...
prescribes its own limitation." 33 The Act, as amended in 1949, provided for a two year limitation period after a claim accrued or one year
after adoption of the amendment, whichever was later. 34 Thus, the suit
was timely filed under the federal act even though barred by the state
limitation period.
The courts have been reluctant to find an exception to the statute
that would toll its running. In Jones v. United States,35 a New York
statute provided for the tolling of the statute of limitations while
another suit on the same cause of action was pending. The court held
that the time period contained in the United States Code governs, and
6
that the local statute had no application.
7
It has generally been held that minority does not toll the statute
and the "saving provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) with respect to
persons under legal disability" is not incorporated into section 2401(b)
and, thus, cannot extend a minor's claim.8 8 In Brown v. United States,8 9

a baby was given an excessive amount of oxygen, resulting in blindness.
Minority did not toll the federal limitation period. The alleged negligence occurred in 1955, but suit was not brought until 1963. Timely
institution of the suit by the parent or guardian is necessary to protect
an infant's claim. 40 Jackson v. United States41 held that the federal
statute of limitations is not tolled because of insanity or mental incompetency even though Jackson alleged he was not mentally competent
to bring suit until four years after receiving his injuries. Other decisions have held the statute not tolled due to non-appointment of an
administrator, 42 inability to obtain proof of a cause of action, 43 continuing negligent treatment, 44 filing and dismissal of a state and federal
83 Id. at 766.
84 United States v. Westfall, 197 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1952).
85 126 F. Supp.

10

(D.D.C. 1954), aff'd, 207 F.2d 563 (1954),

cert. denied, 347 U.S. 921

(1954).
86 Id.
87 Mann v. United States, 399 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1968); Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d

578 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Glenn, 231 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 926 (1956); Harper v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md. 1965); Pittman v.
United States, 210 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Cal. 1962), aff'd, 341 F.2d 739 (1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 941 (1965); Finn v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
38 Harper v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 645, 646 (D. Md. 1965).
89 353 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1965).
40 Id.
41234 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. S.C. 1964).
42 Foote v. Public Housing Com'r of United States, 107 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Mich.
1952).
43 Tinkoff v. United States, 211 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1954).
44 Kossick v. United States, 330 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 837 (1964).
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action on the same suit," correspondence between claimant's attorney
and legal officers for the government, 4 or the plaintiff's ignorance
of his injury. 47 Nonetheless, the courts have allowed exceptions when
elements of fraud are involved. Thus, in Rahn v. United States,48 the
statute was tolled when negligent facts were concealed by a physician,
and the statute began to run only when the facts were discovered. In
Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Company,49 a railroad agent
induced the plaintiff to postpone filing of his claim until he reached
twenty one years of age by representing that he would then have three
years in which to institute an action for his injuries.
Under Texas law an injured employee who is covered by workmen's
compensation may either follow his statutory remedy for benefits from
the compensation carrier, or, in the alternative, he may pursue his
common law remedy against the negligent tortfeasor. 50 If the injured
employee initially sues at common law and prosecutes the suit to a
final judgment or settlement, he is precluded from later filing a claim
for benefits under the compensation statute. 51 The underlying rationale
is that by pursuing his rights at common law against the negligent tortfeasor, he, in effect, destroys the subrogation rights of the insurance
carrier. 52 Should he proceed initially under the compensation act, the
two year statute of limitations 58 as applied to personal injury actions 54
is
payment.
of
obligation
assumes
carrier
the
that
time
such
tolled until
After settlement of the compensation claim, this action does not preclude a common law action for damages against the negligent third
party.5 5 The carrier in making payments under the compensation award
is subrogated (to the extent of those payments) to the rights of the
injured employee in an action brought against the tortfeasor.56 The
subrogation rights become established and the statute of limitations
45 Kington v. United States, 396 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 896
(1968); Humphreys v. United States, 272 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1959).
46 Whealton v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Va. 1967).
47 Tessier v. United States, 269 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1959).
48 222 F. Supp. 775 (S.D. Ga. 1963).
49 178 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 919 (1950).
50 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307 § 6(a) (1917); Fidelity Union Casualty Company
v. Texas Power & Light Company, 35 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1931, writ ref'd).
51 Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Brandon, 126 Tex. 636, 89 S.W.2d 982 (1936); Argonaut
Underwriters Ins. Co, v. Ellis, 335 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, no writ);
Garza v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 251 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App.
-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Younger Brothers, Inc. v. Moore, 135 S.W.2d 780
(Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
52 Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Fish, 266 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526, § 6 (1897).

54 Webster v. Isbell, 71 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1934), rev. on other
grounds 100 S.W.2d 350 (1937).
55 Kelley v. Summers, 210 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1954); Pedigo & Pedigo v. Croom, 37
S.W.2d 1074 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, writ ref'd); City of Austin v. Johnson, 204
S.W. 1181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1918), aff'd 240 S.W. 523 (1922).
56 Kelley v. Summers, 210 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1954).
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begins to run from the date of payment or assumption of the original
57
award or judgment, and not the judicial finality of the same.
In the instant case, the circuit court followed the rule they had previously announced in Quinton v. United States.58 The accrual of a cause
of action under section 2401(b) is a matter determined in accordance
with federal law, and the federal statute is not tolled as is the Texas
statute under state law. The court reasoned that a cause of action
accrued and the limitation period began to run in 1963 when Mendiola
sustained discernible injuries, and that this barred the cause of action
in 1965. The fact that Texas law tolled the statute during settlement
of the workmen's compensation claim is immaterial because section
2401(b) contains no tolling provisions and does not incorporate either
expressly, or impliedly, state tolling provisions. The Maryland Casualty
Company was subrogated to the rights of Mendiola and could not assert
any right that he could not, and thus, their claim was also barred.5"
To avoid the result reached in Mendiola, one possible solution would
be to negotiate a compromise settlement agreement between the injured party and the compensation carrier.6 0 At this point, the subrogated carrier could pursue the common law cause of action against the
United States. The only limitation is that the suit must be instituted
within two years from the date of the original injury.
Although the Supreme Court of the United States held in Erie v.
Tompkins6' that there was no federal common law, it would appear
that the majority rule is based upon a practical, rather than a literal,
interpretation of the federal statute of limitations. The preceding cases
demonstrate that the federal courts that follow the majority rule will
determine for themselves when a cause of action accrues, rather than
adopt the approach which may have been applied by the state court had
the cause of action been entirely local in nature. It would appear that
the phrase in section 2401(b) "when such claim accrues" is a sufficient
basis for the federal courts to use as justification for "not" following
a literal interpretation of the statute and thus strictly following the law
of the state in determining when a cause of action accrues. When a
cause of action accrues, however, the federal courts follow a more literal
application and rarely allow the tolling of the statute.
Stanley R. Baker
57 Derr v. Argonaut Underwriters Insurance Company, 339 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Austin 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Yeary v. Hinojosa, 307 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Brooks v. Lucky, 308 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Texas & Pacific
Ry. Co., 129 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
58 Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962).
59 Mendiola v. United States, 401 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1968).
s0TEX. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 12 (1917).
61 Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).
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